Let\u27s Get Moving: Labor\u27s survival depends on organizing industry-wide for justice and power by Lerner, Stephen
Labor Research Review 
Volume 1 | Number 18 
Let's Get Moving! Organizing for the '90's Article 10 
1991 
Let's Get Moving: Labor's survival depends on organizing industry-
wide for justice and power 
Stephen Lerner 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Labor Research Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please 
contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
© 1991 by Labor Research Review 
Let's Get Moving: Labor's survival depends on organizing industry-wide for justice 
and power 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Despite our almost universal lack of significant organizing victories, we continue to organize in 
basically the same way we have for the last 37 years. Labor's model for organizing remains a site-by-site 
NLRB approach. We continue to fine-tune a model that most organizers know hasn't worked in years. 
Depending on how you define success, it can be argued that our current method of organizing hasn't 
worked in 37 years. 
Keywords 
union organizing, unionization, strategy 
This article is available in Labor Research Review: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/lrr/vol1/iss18/10 

L A B O R R E S E A R C H R E V I E W # 1 8 
Let's Get 
Moving 
Labor#s survival depends on organizing 
industry-wide for justice and power 
• Stephen Lerner 
By the year 2000 unions may represent only 5% of the private 
sector workforce. Despite increased emphasis by some unions on 
organizing, no union is consistently organizing large private sector 
units. This is true throughout the country, including regions and 
industries of traditional labor strength. Even if labor's hemorrhag-
ing among currently organized workers is stopped, there is no 
reason to believe our current level of activity and success in 
organizing will stop labor's slide into irrelevance. 
Our continued inability to organize doesn't just mean we won't 
gain new members. It threatens every aspect of the labor 
movement: 
• We are increasingly unable to improve wages and benefits for 
our members because we've lost majority control of industries 
and markets. 
• We are becoming less able to move labor's larger social and 
legislative agenda. 
• Our decline in the private sector will ultimately undermine our 
ability to organize and protect public sector workers. 
• Stephen Lerner is director of Building Service Division Organizing for the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU). 
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• The combination of increasingly inferior contracts and an anti-
labor environment makes organizing even more difficult. 
Despite our almost universal lack of significant organizing 
victories, we continue to organize in basically the same way we 
have for the last 37 years. Labor's model for organizing remains 
a site-by-site NLRB approach. We continue to fine-tune a model 
that most organizers know hasn't worked in years. Depending on 
how you define success, it can be argued that our current method 
of organizing hasn't worked in 37 years. 
FALLING BEHIND FOR 3 7 YEARS? 
There is a myth that drives much of the thinking about both 
the cause of labor's current decline and the resulting ideas on how 
we can reverse this decline. The myth is that prior to the Reagan 
era and before the growth of union-busting management con-
sultants, unions had been slowly growing in numbers and power. 
If true, then the source of our weakness in organizing and 
bargaining is the increased combativeness of employers, sanc-
tioned and enhanced by anti-union, anti-worker Reagan and Bush 
administrations. 
But it's not true. In 1954 union membership as a percentage of 
the workforce peaked at nearly 35%. With a little more than 17 
million union workers then, the number of union members did 
increase by more than 3 million from 1954 to 1980. But in 1980 
these 20 million union workers represented just 23% of the work-
force. Though our numbers were growing, union power had been 
declining for 26 years before Reagan took office. Whereas unions 
once represented one of every 3 workers, by 1980 we represented 
only one of every 4 1/2. Today we represent less than one of 5. 
This is an enormous loss in power. 
Successful organizing needs to be defined as organizing enough 
workers to increase the percentage of workers represented by 
unions in their industries and nationally. That is, we must organize 
more workers than jobs created every year. If growth in the union 
percentage of the workforce, both in any given industry and in 
the nation as a whole, is not accepted as our definition for success, 
then we accept a prescription for continued decline. 
By this definition, despite temporary increases in total workers 
represented, labor has been unsuccessful in its organizing for 
nearly four decades. 
Since 1954, under Democrats and Republicans, in times of reces-
sion and prosperity, labor has been unable to organize more 
Let's Get Moving! Organizing for the 90s 3 
workers than jobs created. In the 20-year period from 1934 to 1954, 
the percentage of the workforce organized grew from 12% to 
nearly 35%. In the years since, the percentage has dropped to just 
barely 16%. For organizers it is clear that labor's failure to organize 
started long ago—before Reagan, before PATCO, before union-
busters and "modern management," and before the prosperity that 
some claim has made U.S. workers uninterested in organizing. 
It is true that our decline has been faster since Reagan, and 
organizing is more difficult now than in the mid-1960s. But if we 
didn't organize at the peak of our strength, what makes us think 
that by fine tuning a failed model of organizing we can be success-
ful in more difficult times? 
Rather than simply blaming others for our problems, we need 
to confront difficult questions on why we didn't successfully 
organize in friendly economic and political times. We need to meet 
the challenges posed by the demographics of the new workforce-
immigrants, people of color, and women. We need to understand 
the shift to a service economy built on low-wage jobs and how 
this affects organizing and bargaining. We need to figure out how 
we use our remaining power to organize now. We need to relearn 
how to capture imaginations, generate excitement and articulate 
a vision that can mobilize union and nonunion workers. 
HOW DO WE CURRENTLY ORGANIZE? 
In the private sector, the model for organizing over the past 30 
years has essentially remained the same. In simplest terms, it 
involves: 
• targeting a specific site. 
• building an organizing committee and getting workers to sign 
cards, and then petitioning for an NLRB election. 
• conducting the election. 
• if successful, attempting to bargain a contract. 
We don't attempt to cost the employer money until we've won 
an election and begin to bargain. We spend years on election cam-
paigns without gaining the power over employers to sign good 
contracts. 
The organizing is done in a vacuum. Workers do not perceive 
the campaign as part of a larger movement. Many campaigns are 
based on the target being "hot" and are not part of a company, 
industry, market or regional strategy. The campaign is conducted 
and won or lost on the narrow issue of which is more credible— 
I 
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the union's promises or the company's threats. The union is 
defined by our ability to win one more than 50% of the vote on 
a given day. In recent years union promises have become less 
credible while companies have become increasingly more sophis-
ticated—and often accurate—in convincing workers of the futility 
of organizing. 
Successful organizing needs to be defined as organizing 
enough workers to increase the percentage of workers repre-
sented by unions in their industries and nationally. That is, 
we must organize more workers than jobs created every year. 
More than Board delays, unfair labor practices and union-
busting consultants, the fact that management arguments make 
sense is devastating to our ability to organize large numbers of 
workers. Unions can overcome threats, job loss and lies, but how 
do we overcome an employer argument that is more persuasive 
than ours? Not only is it more persuasive, but the whole process 
of organizing reinforces the boss's message: "We are strong. The 
union is weak." 
If we look at a typical organizing campaign, we see that it is 
far from empowering—it alienates people from organizing. The 
boss' message of futility is backed up everyday not just by the anti-
union campaign, but by who large employers are. A major hospital, 
manufacturing plant or university exudes power. From its physical 
size to its power in the community, to management's day-to-day 
control over people's lives, it is clear they have power. 
What do we offer to fight this power? When workers see the 
union, they see a few organizers and co-workers who want the 
union. They hear a lot of rhetoric about unity and standing 
together, but how do we demonstrate that we have more power 
than the boss? How do we demonstrate that we can win changes 
that warrant the risks workers must take to get the union? What 
do we have beyond rhetoric to show how we will get a good 
contract? 
We know how long it takes and how difficult it can be to get 
contracts. We know how marginal many first agreements are. We 
know we often don't get contracts at all. We rarely have a plan 
for how we will win a contract when we start a campaign. Why 
should workers believe we know how to win a good first agree-
ment if we, in fact, often don't know how to? If we can't clearly 
I 
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articulate a rational plan and demonstrate that we have more 
power than the boss, why in the world would workers risk their 
livelihood to support the union? 
We try to build a sense of power through workplace activity, 
actions and "acting like a union." That's what good organizing is 
about. But even where this works in overcoming the boss' cam-
paign and we win an election, it is so time-consuming and expen-
sive that it rules out large-scale organizing. Ironically, the 
employers who we have the power to beat, most of whom have 
treated people so badly that they do organize ("hot shops"), often 
do not have the resources, market conditions or capacity to afford 
a good contract. We end up reinforcing the idea that the union 
can't bargain good contracts because we end up organizing small 
firms who can't afford wage rates that are above the industry 
average. 
The issue isn't that employers oppose the union. That's to be 
expected. Workers in this country and throughout the world have 
faced worse opposition than we do now and yet risked their jobs 
and even their lives to organize. Workers won't organize, on a large 
scale, if we don't offer a program that has a reasonable chance 
for success and a vision worth fighting for. We can't organize non-
union workers through the Board model because they don't believe 
we can win. 
There are some large NLRB victories, but they are the excep-
tion, not the rule. Overall, a site-based NLRB model of organiz-
ing has not organized one new industry or region or been able 
to keep up with the increase in new jobs. In fact, most major gains 
in the last 30 years have not been through NLRB organizing. 
Despite our lack of success in NLRB organizing, there have been 
a few attempts to organize outside the Board. Everyone is critical 
of the Board, but few unions move beyond that model. We invest 
time in trying to reform the Board instead of exploring ways for 
unions to organize around it. 
HOW DID WE ORGANIZE 
DURING TIMES OF LABOR'S GROWTH? 
It is simplistic to say we should organize the way we did in the 
CIO days. We live in dramatically different times. There is always 
a danger when looking to CIO organizing that nostalgia rather than 
analysis will guide us. 
Despite the danger, there are some fundamental differences 
between how organizing was approached during those times of 
labor's sustained growth and now. Most significantly, organizing 
1 
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was industry-based and/or region-wide, not site-based. The goal 
was to organize everybody in an industry or industry segment. 
Based on an analysis of an industry, the organizing drive sought 
to create a movement among all workers in that industry, while 
reaching out to every kind and manner of ally related to the 
industry's workforce. Though a specific employer or site might 
be the focus of a militant confrontation, union organizers made 
it clear that this was part of a larger organizing plan—a plan that 
sought justice and power for all the industry's workers. 
Garment workers organized whole segments of their industry 
(cloakmakers, undergarment workers) and established an 
improved standard for the entire industry. Steel, auto and rubber 
workers organized company-wide and industry-wide drives. Coal 
miners organized whole regions. More recently, the big growth 
of New York's Local 1199 was prior to Board coverage and was 
part of a city wide movement. 
In not one of these cases was the approach to solely organize 
individual sites. In these major victories, workers were part of large 
movements involving thousands of workers. 
From both an organizing and bargaining perspective, these cam-
paigns were based in industry realities. Industry-wide campaigns 
paved the way for power at the table and appealed to workers' 
sense they they were building real power. 
Historically, labor's major gains have come through industry and 
region-wide organizing based on creating a movement with a 
clearly articulated plan for winning justice and power. Few, if any, 
significant sustained gains have come through site organizing 
based on winning Board elections. 
For labor to succeed, we need to organize millions of workers. 
We need to organize and dominate industries and markets so we 
can negotiate good contracts. We need to give workers a reason 
to take risks to organize unions. We need to rebuild a movement 
of workers, organized and unorganized, that makes organizing its 
highest priority. 
BUILDING A MOVEMENT 
Workers won't organize in large numbers in isolation. Workers 
will organize and take risks when they see themselves as part of 
a movement that has a chance to succeed. Only when unions begin 
to capture on a large scale the emotion, anger and excitement of 
workers as part of a larger movement will we be able to organize 
large numbers of workers. 
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The Daily News strike created a mini-movement in New York City. 
(Courtesy 1199 News) 
This sets up a potential Catch 22: You can't organize without 
a movement and there is no movement, so we can't organize. 
For many this means either continuing the status quo or waiting 
for the magical day when "the movement" appears. Both options 
ignore the possibility that by approaching organizing in a funda-
mentally different way, exercising the power labor currently has, 
and taking risks on new ways to exercise power, we can create 
mini-movements that ultimately become the building blocks for 
large-scale organizing nationally. 
A good example of where unions effectively create mini-
movements is in major negotiations in the public and private 
sectors. There are dozens of examples of major contract campaigns 
that mobilize thousands of workers, dominate the media and 
become the issue in a community. We need only think of the 
Machinists at Eastern or the Mine Workers at Pittston, but there 
are dozens of others. (See Labor Research Review #17, "An 
Organizing Model of Unionism.") 
It's not just that we technically know how to build and escalate 
such a campaign. Nor is it just the outcome that is important to 
workers. When we combine large numbers of workers, militant 
action, emotion, concrete deadlines and we force people to take 
sides, we can build an intensity of excitement and involvement 
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that moves workers to do things they wouldn't normally do, and 
this sets the stage for dramatic change. The Daily News strike, 
New York's 1199 contract campaign in 1989, the Oregon Public 
Employees Union in 1987 and again in 1989—all operated on a 
scale and a level of importance that mini-movements were created 
in a way rarely seen in organizing campaigns. We need to figure 
out how to capture this in organizing new members. 
To succeed, we need to approach organizing in a fundamentally 
different fashion. Currently our organizing is driven by the ques-
tion: "How do we win a majority of votes?" 
Instead, we need to ask two questions: 
• How do we develop power to force employers to recognize the 
union and sign good contracts? 
• How do we demonstrate power so nonunion workers want to 
join the union? 
By asking these questions, we set the stage to free ourselves from 
a failed model of organizing and to fight employers on our terms, 
not theirs. 
By asking how we build power rather than how we win a 
majority in an unfair election, we lay the groundwork to move 
beyond one-dimensional NLRB campaigns to multi-layered com-
prehensive campaigns that target large groups of workers in whole 
industries and/or markets. We position ourselves to concentrate 
the power of organized workers, labor's political clout and our 
coalition partners to build a movement to demand justice for 
workers. We go to war armed with dozens of weapons instead of 
being reduced to fighting through the Board. We say to workers, 
the community and employers: The issue is not what percentage 
of workers will vote for the union. The issue is the conditions 
workers work and live under and how we can gain the power to 
win the union and improve conditions. 
USING POWER TO BUILD MINI-MOVEMENTS 
How might it work? There are several concrete examples of such 
mini-movements being built by various unions right now. SEIU's 
Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles is a good example 
(see Andy Banks' article in this issue for more details). But in order 
to flesh out the basic set of ideas outlined above, let's take some 
hypothetical examples and see how a movement-oriented organiz-
ing approach might work in different situations. 
I 
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• ORGANIZING CASE 1: 
A Citywide Healthcare Campaign 
SITUATION: 
Local X represents 10,000 hospital workers in a citywide 
master contract. This represents about 50% of hospital 
workers in the city, but membership growth is stagnant. The 
union's ability to organize and negotiate is continually declin-
ing as the union share of the industry drops in relation to 
the increase in total hospital workers. Nonunion hospitals 
have consistently defeated organizing drives by matching 
close to whatever the union negotiates in the master con-
tract. Financial distress and reorganization have resulted in 
union hospitals operating a growing number of nonunion 
facilities and residual units, which the union has also been 
unsuccessful in organizing. 
Though Local X is gradually getting weaker, it still has 
substantial power it can build upon. It has a history of being 
able to mobilize thousands of members during contract strug-
gles. It also is politically powerful as part of a local labor 
movement that retains a great deal of power in the city and 
the state. The hospital industry is deeply intertwined. 
Doctors and corporate leaders serve on the boards of both 
union and nonunion hospitals, and all hospitals are depen-
dent upon a complicated state-financed reimbursement 
system. 
STRATEGY: 
A traditional site-by-site approach already failed. But there is 
potential here for Local X to create a mini-movement by simul-
taneously running contract and organizing campaigns, and making 
card check recognition of the union in the residual units and non-
union hospitals the number one priority in bargaining. 
Using the excitement and membership involvement of a city-
wide bargaining campaign to involve nonunion workers, Local X 
would build toward a citywide strike—a healthcare crisis—that 
could only be settled through hospitals' agreeing to card-check 
recognition. 
Union members would need to be educated and activated 
around the impact of nonunion hospitals on their ability to bargain 
a good contract. And then these union members would need to 
work on building a broad coalition in support of their bargaining 
and organizing campaigns. Under a general theme that a quality 
healthcare system for workers and patients can only exist with 
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fairly paid and treated unionized workers, a coalition of union 
members and other groups would become the nucleus of a move-
ment. Through demonstrations, sit-ins, media events, etc., the 
coalition would focus the city's attention on the importance of 
solving the healthcare crisis for workers and patients. 
Union activists and their allies would be directly involved in 
organizing nonunion workers into the city wide campaign, 
demonstrating to nonunion workers that they were part of a larger 
movement. Nonunion workers would be plugged into mass 
meetings and other activities. The union bargaining demands 
would be what they were organizing to gain. Instead of confront-
ing a huge powerful hospital with a few co-workers, nonunion 
activists would participate in events that demonstrated the power 
of the union. 
The healthcare industry and healthcare reimbursement systems 
are highly political and are intertwined with massive regulatory 
bureaucracies. Local X would constantly use the regulatory pro-
cess and its links with hospital financing and the business and 
political ties of hospital directors to demonstrate the long-term 
costs of hospitals' insisting on trying to operate nonunion. 
Escalating job actions and street activity would build toward a 
mass strike. The union's threat, which it would need to be 
prepared to act on, would be to use strikers from union hospitals 
to pull out workers from the nonunion hospitals and residual units. 
\ 
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Even if the strike at nonunion units could only pull 20% of the 
workers, it would dramatically magnify the healthcare crisis, 
especially if key occupations struck. A citywide strike of 10,000 
union hospital workers combined with thousands of nonunion 
workers would cripple the industry and allow the union to disrupt 
the whole city. 
Such a strategy involves taking some risks. It is based on the 
idea that if the union is willing and able to create a big enough 
crisis, it can force highly political institutions to accept unioniza-
tion. It is also built on the idea that union members can under-
stand and get excited about organizing nonunion competition. 
Finally, it is based on the idea that we can mobilize at least a mili-
tant minority of nonunion workers into a citywide campaign to 
force hospitals to recognize the union through a card-check. Such 
a strategy can work only if the union is willing to make organiz-
ing its highest priority. 
• ORGANIZ ING CASE 2 : 
Organizing MFG's Suppliers 
SITUATION: 
Union Y represents almost 100% of MFG Corp.'s factory 
workers nationally, but MFG has outsourced much of its 
parts production to nonunion suppliers. The union has lost 
the fight to bring this work back in-house, and in addition 
there is a lot of work that has never been done in-house. 
Economic reality dictates that there will always be a large 
number of outside suppliers. The union has been unable to 
organize the suppliers in the past because suppliers can 
credibly argue that a union contract would make it impossi-
ble for them to compete for parts contracts against nonunion 
suppliers. Besides being almost 100% organized at MFG, 
Union Y has one other lever of power: Its contract with MFG 
allows it to honor authorized picket lines. 
STRATEGY: 
An industry-wide approach here would require Union Y to 
identify a specific product, like the proverbial "widgets," that are 
produced by a manageable number of companies who are depen-
dent on MFG Corp. for most of their work. The union would form 
a National Organizing Committee (NOC) of workers from these 
companies. The NOC would develop standard national demands 
(the basis for an industry contract), and the union would approach 
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each widget company and demand that each agree to a card-check 
recognition procedure. The union would agree that it would not 
attempt to bargain a contract until a majority of widget manufac-
turers had recognized the union. Companies could avoid a fight 
with the union by agreeing to a recognition procedure that-would 
not put them at a competitive disadvantage. Among companies 
that refused the card-check recognition procedure, the union 
would select strike targets. 
MFCs union workers would be organized around the impor-
tance of organizing companies that threaten their jobs and stan-
dards, and they would be educated on their right to honor a picket 
line against struck work. Where possible, they would be active 
participants in organizing nonunion workers to understand the 
power the union had. Nonunion workers would be organized 
around the concept that only through an industry master contract 
could they win improvements and job security. They would see 
the union's power in two ways: through unionized workers' will-
ingness to honor their picket lines and through simultaneous 
organizing activity at all widget companies around the country. 
Workers won't organize in large numbers in isolation. 
Workers will organize and take risks when they see themselves 
as part of a movement that has a chance to succeed. Only when 
unions begin to capture on a large scale the emotion, anger, 
and excitement of workers as part of a larger movement will 
we be able to organize large numbers of workers. 
The effectiveness of a strike would not be based on stopping 
production, but instead on the ability to stop a major customer 
from buying the product. In this context, an Unfair Labor Practice 
strike of a small percentage of a supplier plant could be devas-
tating. While the union is threatening to strike a nonunion supplier, 
union workers would be agitating MFG about not using the struck 
supplier. Union workers would demonstrate concrete power by 
their refusal to handle struck goods. Nonunion workers would 
have real power and would respond to an ability to cripple their 
employer with relatively little risk (since scabs would be ineffec-
tive because the real target is the customer). 
Employers won't fight the union as hard if being union doesn't 
threaten their market position. Targeting the entire industry and 
linking bargaining to the competition also being union allows us 
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to play different companies against each other. 
Nonunion workers will be willing to take greater risks if there 
is a clear plan and a demonstration of union power. Targeting a 
whole industry sector gives the union large numbers, a rational 
target, and the potential to capture the imagination of nonunion 
workers. 
• ORGANIZING CASE 3: 
Publicly Funded Private Sector Jobs 
SITUATION: 
The city of Unionburg, with a population of 1 million, is a 
former union stronghold. The private sector is still heavily 
organized, but union membership has declined with the loss 
of thousands of manufacturing jobs. There are 30,000 
unionized public employees, but jobs are being lost to privati-
zation as the city and other public entities increasingly rely 
on private contractors. Union researchers have gone through 
city contracts and have identified thousands of jobs being 
done nonunion—jobs ranging from laundries to microfiche 
filming, to law firms and consultants that employ large 
numbers of clerical workers. It is clear that a huge number 
of nonunion private sector jobs are dependent on city money, 
jobs in both traditionally organized industries and in sectors 
labor has little base in. 
STRATEGY: 
Unionburg could be a good place to develop a mini-movement 
around what kinds of jobs public money is supporting. A multi-
union citywide campaign to organize companies funded by city 
money could regain membership lost to privatization. This would 
increase total citywide union membership, thereby strengthen-
ing labor's political clout. Unions would gain footholds and 
leverage in new industries and would eventually build a citywide 
movement to support organizing and bargaining demands. 
Such a strategy would involve five distinct parts: 
1) Citywide mobilization of public and private sector unions. 
2) Research of city-funded work to identify targets for multi-
union organizing campaigns. 
3) A bargaining campaign by city workers to oppose further 
privatization and to win contract language allowing public workers 
to honor picket lines and refuse to work with law-breaking 
contractors. 
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4) A legislative program to pass laws that assist organizing— 
e.g., Davis-Bacon type laws that establish minimum wages and 
benefits for all workers whose employers are recipients of city 
or state funds, or procedures that quickly disbar contractors who 
violate laws. 
5) A citywide coalition of labor, community, religious and 
political leaders to support the idea that jobs created by public 
money need to pay and treat workers decently. This coalition 
would fight low-wage contracting policies that create poverty- level 
jobs and increase social service costs. 
The campaign would build a citywide movement calling for 
justice for thousands of contracted workers. The strategy is to coor-
dinate campaigns for legislation and new contract language and 
combine them with organizing drives to win leverage over con-
tractors to force them to go union. Each piece feeds off each other. 
Oregon Public Employees Union/SEIU Local 503 campaigns are 
conducted in coalition with other groups representing workers in the 
private sector, client groups, and nonprofits dependent on similar sources 
of funding. The rally pictured above, centered around the Union's state 
employee contract campaign of 1989. (Photo by Bentley Gilbert, 
SEIU Local 503) 
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The ultimate power is the ability to cost contractors their city 
funding. Once labor has this power, workers and contractors will 
see the advantages of being union. 
Nonunion workers provide the motivation and ammunition for 
the campaign. These workers would be approached as part of a 
mass campaign for contracted workers. Meetings would be for 
multiple contractors and would be part of the citywide campaign. 
Nonunion worker activists, telling stories of low wages and 
mistreatment, would be the core of many campaign events. 
Private sector unions would activate their members to organize 
industry counterparts among targeted contractors. 
Public sector workers would be activated around stopping 
privatization, while at the same time fighting for contract language 
that would benefit the organizing campaign among contracted 
workers. Nonlabor groups would be mobilized to fight to protect 
and improve city services and to win justice for contracted 
workers. The aim would be to build outrage that the city is the 
ultimate source of gross exploitation. 
Thirty thousand public employees, thousands of unionized 
private sector workers, thousands of nonunion contracted workers, 
and dozens of community groups and leaders would be affected 
by and involved in the campaign. The multiple goals of protec-
ting current jobs, wages, and benefits and organizing new workers 
offer the opportunity to mobilize activity for thousands of union 
members while using labor's power to organize thousands of non-
union workers. 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding where labor's current strength is allows us to 
plan large-scale campaigns that offer the potential for protecting 
our base and organizing large numbers of workers. 
Only by targeting on a grand scale and by taking big risks can 
we succeed in organizing. By moving beyond NLRB site-by-site 
organizing, we open the door to mass campaigns that involve 
current members, the community and nonunion workers in 
building a movement for justice. 
There is a window of opportunity now for this kind of organiz-
ing. There is an increasing recognition of the depth of labor's crisis, 
combined with a willingness to hear new ideas. 
We still have enough power to directly impact our ability to 
organize. But if we do not use these opportunities now, it may 
soon be too late. • 
